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RECOGNITION OF CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT
Recognition is the act of a state, itself a member of the family
of nations, by which it admits the existence of another government
as an international person, either for all purposes or only for certain
purposes of government. It is essentially the recognition of a fact.
Nothing is created. The government to be recognized exists inde-
pendently of any act of another state. The recognition, however,
gives a status under the law of nations and assures it of treatment
by the foreign states as an international person to the extent to which
the recognition goes. As it is a recognition of a fact, the sympathies
and prejudices of the foreign nation should not affect the question.'
There seems to be no absolute duty to recognize.2 Each state acts
according to its own policy. If the requisite facts exist, ordinarily
recognition will follow as a matter of course.
A change of government implies a prior government and this note
does not deal with the recognition of new states in territories where
none existed before. The change may leave the former government
still in existence, but no longer with authority over the particular terri-
tory where the change occurs, or it may destroy it entirely. In the
first case it may be due to a rebellion of a part of the people, or it
may be through conquest or cession. In the second case it may be
through the regular constitutional means, or it may be by a revolution.
The former government may also be merged with some other.
If territory is lost through rebellion, there are three degrees of
recognition; first, of belligerency; second, as a de facto government;
third, of independence. Recognition of belligerency is an admission
that there is an insurgent movement carrying on war. The effect is to
constitute the rebellious people an international person, so far as the
laws of war are concerned, in their dealings with the recognizing
state. When to make such a recognition is a matter for each state to
determine. Ordinarily, however, when the necessary elements exist,
recognition will follow. These elements are: the existence of a de
facto government, ruling over a more or less definite territory, obeyed
by the people of that territory, and capable of assuming the obliga-
1 See Moore Int. Law Dig. 43, on the recognition of the various govern-
ments of France and the refusal to prematurely recognize the South Ameri-
cam Republics, Moore 1. 49, 50.
'Maxey. Vol. 4, Ch. 1.
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tions imposed by the laws of war. Secondly, there must exist an
actual war, conducted according to international law, by military
forces on both sides, employing the means and methods of warfare.
Thirdly, the state recognizing belligerency must be so involved in the
results of the struggle that it is necessary for the preservation of its
interests that the respective status of the three parties be defined. For
instance, if the insurgent territory is not contiguous to the foreign
state and there are no commercial relations between them, this neces-
sity would not exist and recognition would be a gratuitous interfer-
ence. Pomeroy dissents from the view that there must be any inter-
ests of the foregin state involved, claiming that recognition is an
obligation imposed by the laws of neutrality. He is, however, unsup-
ported by authority or precedents. Maxey includes among the requisite
facts an assertion of independence. This is not discussed by other
authorities. While such an assertion usually accompanies a rebellion
of the magnitude contemplated, there seems to be on principle, no
necessity for it. The recognition is of a fact-the fact of a war. This
might exist between portions of a state neither of which seek inde-
pendence of each other, and might give rise to the same necessity of a
foreign state's treating them as belligerents. If the law at the time
of the American Revolution had been the same as it is today the
American Colonies would have been recognized as belligerents before
the -Declaration of Independence. If the above elements are not in
existence, recognition would be premature and the parent state would
:have just cause for offense.3
Recognition as a de facto state is more than recognition of belliger-
ency, but less than that of independence. It treats the insurgents as
the actual governing body over a certain territory, but is informal
and does not concede them a place as a member of the family of
nations. It is justified when the insurgent government is actually
ruling the land, as in the case of belligerency, and there is a need
that there be some one with whom the foreign nation may treat. It is
chiefly a recognition of the government in regard to matters of com-
merce, its merchant flag is respected, and matters regarding commerce
are transacted with it, but informally. There must be a probability
that the hostilities will continue, and a fair likelihood of insurgent
3 Dana's note in Wheaton, p. 24, n. 15; Oppenheim, Sec. 74; Maxey, part 4,Ch. 1; Lawrence, 4th ed., Sec. 141; Moore,Int. Law Dig. Sec. 59. Grant, Annual
Message, Dec. 6, 1869; and Special Message, June 13, 1870, in Moore, Sec. 17;
Pomeroy, Sec. 224. Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635; Moore, Sec. 59.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol2/iss1/4
NOTES.
success, but certainty is not necessary. The recognition may be as of
as much as the needs of the foreign state may require, but can be of
no more and must not be of facts which are not actually existing.f
The third and highest form of recognition accorded the insurgent
members of a state is that of independence. It admits them to be a
complete international person, a member of the family of nations,
and independent of the sovereignty of any state. It also is a recog-
nition of a fact; the state must be actually independent. It is to be
given "when independence is established as a fact, so as to leave the
chance of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly des-
perate." 5 There must be an organized government, able and willing to
assume the obligations and duties of a state ruling over a definite area,
acknowledged by the people, though absolute internal tranquility is
not required. Hostilities between it and the parent state must have
virtually ceased. If there is still a reasonable chance that the latter
may ultimately subdue the rebellious people, the recognition would be
premature. It is not necessary, however, that the parent government
should itself have recognized the insurgents, or that all efforts on its
part have been abandoned. There must be a moral certainty that they
will be fruitless. The recognition may be conditional.8
If the change of government over a certain piece of territory is
effective by cession or by a treaty of peace, there is really nothing to
recognize formally. The ceding government itself authorizes the
change and foreign states will take the facts as they are. In the case
of conquest, without a formal treaty, the case is a little different. If
an entire state is seized, leaving no government to treat with, no for-
mal recognition is necessary.7  If there is a state beaten, but still
claiming lands in the firm possession of its enemy, it is said to be
analogous to case of a rebellion. If the conquering state intends to
keep the territory and the fighting is hopeless and practically over, a
third state may recognize the sovereignty of the conqueror s
Where the former government is overthrown by ordinary and
constitutional means, as in the case of the succession of a new mon-
' Pomeroy, 236; Dana's Wheaton, p. 41, n. 16; Maxey, part 3, Ch. 1.5 Adams, Sec. of State, to Munroe, Pres., Aug. 24, 1816. Moore, 1, 30.
6 Pomeroy, 241; Phillimore 11, 19, 20; Dana's Wheaton, p. 42, note; Oppen-
heim 74; Jackson, Texas Message, Dec. 21, 1836; Hall, 9th Ed., 90-93; Moore,
Sec. 27.
T As in the Prussian conquest of Hanover.
I Pomeroy, 219-222.
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arch or the election of a new administration, the status of the nation
is unchanged and there is no need of any recognition.
If one nation merges itself with another, as Texas with the
United States, or two or more join together as in the case of the
German Empire, recognition follows as a matter of course.10
The questions arising from a revolutionary attempt to supplant
the former government are very similar to those arising from an
attempt of a part of the people to establish their independence. Bel-
ligerency may be recognized, and a de facto government exercising
whatever authority is exercised over a certain territory may be treated
with informally, though recognition in its most complete sense is
denied. Recognition as the true government in its full sense is ac-
corded on much the same facts as that of independence. It must be
actually in power and performing the functions of government. There
must be a definite area and at least a large majority of the people
must acquiesce. Resistance by the former government cannot be
more than desultory and must be without any reasonable likelihood
of success. The character of the ruler, the source and the motives of
the movement, and the means used in obtaining success are not ordi-
narily noticed by the foreign state. Precedents may be found for
withholding recognition where the policy of the foreign state demands
it, as England's refusal to recognize Napoleon."
Recognition may be made in several ways. A formal declaration
is often resorted to. It may be implied. Belligerency is recognized,
among other ways, by a proclamation of neutrality; a de facto state;
by informal correspondence. Independence is recognized by a treaty
with the new states, the receiving or sending of diplomatic agents, etc.
The political and legislative branches of government possess the
powers of recognition. The judiciary will treat it as a political ques-
tion and follow the course of action taken by the other departments of
government.
The most interesting recent case of this character was the refusal
of the United States to recognize Huerta. Huerta's government seems
clearly to have been an actual one. That of Madero had no longer
any personal existence. The rew one was in possession of the greater
9 Pomeroy, 248.10 Moore, Sec. 27.
11 Moore, Sec. 43ff (Course of the United States in regard to France,
Spain, South American Republics, etc.); Pomeroy, 248; Wharton's Digest, Sec.
70ff.
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part of the country, and while there were various rebellions, it had a
comparatively firm hold on its power at the time that the European
nations gave it recognition. The previous course of the United States
had been to disregard the character and the means used in obtaining
power, so the objection that there was strong likelihood that Madero
was murdered seems out of line with precedent. While there had been
no popular election, this was also the case apparently in many of
the South and Central American governments, and was held no bar
to their recognition. The large part of the Mexican people acquiesced
in the Huerta government, even if they did not altogether approve
of it. The refusal, however, is not properly a breach of law, as there
is no legal obligation. The cases where it has been refused, however,
as in the case of Maximillian in Mexico, and England's refusal to
recognize Napoleon, were governed by a larger principle of public
policy than any objection to a particular ruler. The case seems out of
accord with the previous courses taken by the United States in this
regard.
There seems to have been little reason for having recognized
Carranza that would not have been equally applicable to the case of
Huerta. Certainly there was no other government than that of Huerta,
though its authority was somewhat shaky, in part of the territory, its
claim to rule was a government in fact, and as such might have been
recognized.
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